I’ve been thinking about putting together a short book on friendship in the spiritual life, by expanding on a paper I wrote on the topic of friendship as part of my Great Books seminar during college. I posted the sections of that paper on my blog back in 2005.
Since many visitors arrive at my blog while searching for the posts on friendship, and because the recent migration from a WordPress.com blog has rendered the original posts a bit hard to find, I have reposted the articles here on my new self-hosted blog.
I introduced my paper in this way:
The topic of friendship has been addressed through the ages in a variety of ways that reflect the very personal nature of friendship; each of the writers that I have researched for this paper have distinctive views on the subject, probably the result of their own personal experiences. However, my goal in writing this paper was not to discover why these writers have arrived at different interpretations of the nature of friendship. Instead, I wanted to examine recurring themes in order to arrive at a description, however incomplete, of what friendship truly is. I chose to analyze the ideas of Aristotle, Cicero, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Michel de Montaigne, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Robert Hugh Benson. What follows is a summary of my discoveries.
Here’s the outline for the college paper, along with links to each section:
Friendship as natural for the human person
Characteristics of true friendship
- Familiarity
- Choice
- Shared situations and interests
- Pleasure
- Charity
- Self-love
- Trust
- Respect
- Justice
- Criticism
- Virtue
The degree of loyalty proper to friends
Personal reflections on friendship
I’ve added a few sources and quotes this time around, and amended some sections.
Friendship as natural for the human person
Aristotle, Cicero, and Saint Augustine seem to agree that man as an individual has a natural inclination to associate with others. Aristotle states this clearly in his Nicomachean Ethics when he writes that “man is by nature a social and political being.” This idea is crucial not only to his ideas about friendship, but also to his political theory, for he says that the polis (or Greek state) is built of associations between men and that for this reason the polis is a natural entity. Cicero joins him in his assertion that a person seeks the company of others. In his essay on friendship, Cicero mentions that “friendship takes its beginning from our very nature…” and that “nature abhors solitude.” Thus friendship is viewed as a phenomenon that satisfies a person’s innate need to associate with others. The social nature of the human being is also mentioned by Saint Augustine, who teaches “that the person, while being an absolute… is also and essentially a being… related to others, open to others, and defined as person by his very relativity.” In other words, man is himself only to the extent that he is in relation to others. All of the above statements lead to the conclusion that man has a natural desire to relate to others and that friendship is the way in which this need is fulfilled.
Types of friendship
What forms does friendship take? How do people fulfill their social needs? Aristotle answers this question in no uncertain terms. He divides friendship into three distinct types that are based on the three objects worthy of affection: the good, the pleasant, and the useful. The lowest form of friendship is the useful type, which arises when men agree on an exchange of goods for mutual benefit. The affection in this type of friendship is not “affection for one another per se but in terms of the good accruing to each from the other.” The next type is the friendship based on pleasure, which is associated with emotional relationships and (in particular) romantic relationships. Both the useful and the pleasant friendships are considered as friendships “only incidentally, since the object of affection is not loved for being the kind of person he is, but for providing some good or pleasure.” In contrast, the highest form of friendship is the one based in virtue, which involves good men engaging in it for its own sake. In this situation, “each partner is both good in the unqualified sense and good for his friend.” This type of friendship encompasses the useful and pleasant types, because that which is good is also pleasant and useful.
This model of the hierarchy of friendship has prevailed throughout the ages. Cicero alludes to it when, in an effort to distinguish the best type of friendship, he writes: “I am not now speaking of the friendships of everyday folk, or of ordinary people – although even these are a source of pleasure and profit – but of true and perfect friendship.” As further evidence that Aristotle has established a lasting set of norms for the discussion of friendship, one need not look farther than the work of the sixteenth-century essayist Michel de Montaigne, who writes that “all associations that are forged and nourished by pleasure and profit… [are] the less friendships, in so far as they mix into friendship another cause and object and reward than friendship itself.” Clearly Aristotle’s influence on the discussion of the forms of friendship is a formidable one.
Characteristics of true friendship
There is a definite congruence of thought about the characteristics of true friendship; familiarity, similarity, respect and trust are all qualities universally associated with friendship. While the ideas expressed about these and other aspects of friendship are largely the same from writer to writer, each writer brings to the discussion a unique perspective. Drawing upon my sources, I have identified eleven characteristics which illuminate the nature of true friendship.
1. Familiarity
One of the most essential elements of friendship is familiarity. Aristotle points this out when he draws a distinction between good will and affection by saying that “affection involves familiarity, whereas good will can arise on the spur of the moment.” For Aristotle, while good will marks the start of friendship, it reveals that a relationship has not yet arrived at the maturity of affection. Cicero agrees with this view and draws upon some proverbial knowledge to make his point: “There is real truth in the familiar saying that people must eat many a peck of salt together if they are to know the full meaning of friendship.” Ralph Waldo Emerson takes this idea one step further when he warns against friendships that are quickly constructed: “Our friendships hurry to short and poor conclusions, because we have made them a texture of wine and dreams, instead of the tough fibre of the human heart…. We snatch at the slowest fruit in the whole garden of God, which many summers and many winters must ripen.” It is evident from these observations that two people must spend time getting to know each other before they can engage in a true friendship.
2. Choice
As two people become familiar with one another, they discover good and bad qualities in each other and on the basis of these qualities, they make a choice – although perhaps not always consciously – either to deepen their relationship with each other or to let it weaken. Choice is a key factor in the development of friendship; in the words of Aristotle, “mutual affection involves choice.” When choice (as represented by good will) is eliminated from a relationship, it can no longer be truly called friendship, as Cicero points out: “Relatives may lose their goodwill, friends cannot, for once goodwill is lost, the friend is no longer a friend, but the relative is still a relative.” This idea is made even more explicit by Montaigne, who speaks of choice as an exercise of free will:
Father and son may be of entirely different dispositions, and brothers also. He is my son, he is my kinsman, but he is an unsociable man, a knave, or a fool. And then, the more they are friendships which law and natural obligation impose on us, the less of our choice and free will there is in them. And our free will has no product more properly its own than affection and friendship.
Clearly, then, friendship involves an election or choice, and Montaigne intimates above that it is based on a similarity of disposition.
3. Shared situations and interests
Although Montaigne merely hints at this similarity between friends, Aristotle makes it explicit when he says that friendship involves an element of sharing: “Friendship is present to the extent that men share something in common… Friendship consists in community.” On one level, Aristotle is speaking of a physical community. He makes numerous mentions of the fact that “nothing characterizes friends as much as living in each other’s company.” He also speaks of the sharing of common interests as a mark of friendship in his discussion of the master/slave relationship: “The part and the whole… have an identical interest; and the slave is a part of the master, in the sense of being a living but separate part of his body. There is thus a community of interest, and a relation of friendship, between master and slave…” Cicero takes the argument further when he states that “the one element indispensable to friendship [is] a complete agreement in aims, ambitions, and attitudes.” From these arguments, it becomes evident that friendship does depend on a certain sharing and that the common element that brings men together can be a situation, a belief, a goal, or a disposition.
4. Pleasure
One of the more obvious characteristics of friends is that they enjoy being with one another. To put it in the language of Aristotle, “It is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they are pleasant [in one another’s eyes] and find joy in the same things. It is this quality which seems typical of comradeship.” A friend can lift our spirits, and this is one of the most attractive aspects of friendship. As Saint Augustine writes: “Is not the unfeigned confidence and mutual love of true and good friends our one solace in human society, filled as it is with misunderstandings and calamities?” Our friends can make us happy because the love they show is given freely and sincerely, as Cicero notes: “What we get from a friend gives us joy since it comes to us with love.” The affection of friendship makes it pleasurable; true friends enjoy being around each other because it gives them an opportunity to give and receive affection.
5. Charity
Affection is expressed by a person through his willingness to serve his friend. Aristotle emphasizes this charitable aspect of friendship when he writes that “friendship appears to consist in giving rather than in receiving affection.” He implies that friendship involves a certain selflessness, and this sentiment is confirmed by Cicero, who asks: “How many things are there which we would not do for our own sake, but which we are constantly doing for the sake of our friends?” Emerson communicates the same idea when he notes that “the only reward of virtue is virtue; the only way to have a friend is to be one.” From these comments, one concludes that in friendship a person removes the focus from himself and shifts it to his companion. Montaigne says that this shift is negligible in true friendship because, in this situation, everything is shared and so no benefits actually belong to either person. He does admit, however, that in a friendship both persons are “seeking above all things to benefit the other.” From a Christian perspective, this quality can be likened to the divine love of God, and from a Catholic point of view, it is this element of friendship that gives it a sacramental character. As Robert Hugh Benson writes in The Friendship of Christ: “It seeks to win nothing, to produce nothing – but to sacrifice all. Even where the supernatural motive is absent, it can reflect on the natural plane… the characteristics of divine charity.” From all of the above observations, it is clear that friendship involves a degree of self-sacrifice.
6. Self-love
This self-giving stems from a healthy sense of self. According to Aristotle, “…the friendly relations which we have with our neighbors and which serve to define the various kinds of friendship seem to be derived from our relations to ourselves.” He continues by listing attitudes that a person expresses toward a friend (such as a desire for the friend’s existence and good) and shows that a good man has all these feelings in relation to himself, “for his friend is really another self.” Cicero echoes these ideas while placing an emphasis on the need for self-confidence: “The more confidence a man has in himself, the more he finds himself so fortified by virtue and wisdom that he is completely self-sufficient and believes that his destiny is in his own hands, so much the better will he be both at making and at keeping friends.” This confidence, stemming from a love of self, is essential to friendship with others. Cicero is saying that a true friend is dear to someone in the way that a person is dear to himself; in this respect, a friend is a “second self.” This term has become a cliche by the time of Montaigne; he uses it without a word of explanation when he describes the death of his closest friend: “I was already so formed and accustomed to being a second self everywhere that only half of me seems to be alive now.” On the basis of these statements, it can be concluded that friendship consists in a love similar to and dependent on self-love.
7. Trust
Friendship also requires trust. Aristotle writes that “the friendship of good men implies mutual trust” and Cicero says that “the foundation of that steadfastness and loyalty for which we are looking in friendship is trust, for nothing endures that cannot be trusted.” This trust, which is crucial to the existence of friendship, goes hand in hand with honesty; in fact, honesty naturally flows out of trust. Cicero suggests this when he observes that “hypocrisy is vicious… it is particularly inimical to friendship, for it makes honesty impossible, and without honesty the word ‘friendship’ has no meaning.” If a friend is not honest with us, we can no longer trust him. This puts an end to friendship because a friend is, by Emerson’s definition, someone who can be trusted and with whom we can speak the truth (i.e. be honest). Thus the qualities of trust and honesty are inseparable and both belong to the nature of friendship.
8. Respect
Two people could hardly be considered friends if they did not hold each other in high regard. Friends must see qualities in each other that they admire, or else the relationship will not be a friendship in the highest sense. Aristotle writes that “it is clear that good men alone can be friends on the basis of what they are.” In other words, good men respect one another, and this is the basis of true friendship. Indeed, Cicero writes the following epigram in praise of respect: “Take respect out of friendship and you deprive it of its noblest crown.” Emerson takes a slightly more moderate view, stating that while respect is an attitude appropriate to friendship, it is most deeply associated with the self: “In strictness, the soul does not respect men as it respects itself.” This assertion, however, does not diminish the importance of respect in friendship because, as was mentioned earlier, the attitude we exhibit toward our friends is a mirror of the view we have of ourselves.
9. Justice
Friendship also involves a sense of what is fair and right, a sense of justice. This notion is very important in the writings of Aristotle. For him, the just is something subordinate to friendship: “When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. In fact, the just in the fullest sense is regarded as constituting an element of friendship.” Carrying the idea into his political theory, he views a type of friendship as the bond that creates a coherent state, a bond that provides a certain sort of justice. After a discussion of the different types of political constitutions, he writes that “each of these constitutions exhibits friendship to the same extent that it exhibits [a notion of] what is just.” For him, friendship and justice are closely interrelated. Emerson shies away from this practical notion of friendship by stressing that friendship is much more than mere justice and that it cannot be reduced to a fair exchange. In his own words, “We chide the citizen because he makes love a commodity… and quite loses sight of the delicacies and nobility of the relation.” This is not a denial of the importance of justice in friendship, but rather a request for a deeper look into the qualities of friendship.
10. Criticism
In addition to treating each other justly, friends offer constructive criticism to one another. According to Aristotle, friends take pleasure in each other’s goodness and they “neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so.” A good man will not tolerate wrongdoing on the part of his friend: “The… man who will put up with – and likewise refuse to put up with – the right things in the right manner… is the kind of person we mean when we speak of a ‘good friend’.” Cicero agrees that friends should correct one another when they stray from prudent behavior, but states that the motive for the criticism must be the benefit of the person criticized: “It often happens that friends must be admonished and even reprimanded, and this we must take in good part when it is offered in a spirit of charity.” He continues by saying that flattery is worse than criticism, “for by failing to call wrongdoing to account, it lets a friend fall to his ruin,” and concludes that “it is an essential part of true friendship… to offer and to receive admonition.” Thus, the exchange of helpful criticism marks a real friendship. In contrast, Montaigne admits a certain reluctance to criticize others: “I do not make it my business to tell the world what it should do – enough others do that – but what I do in it.” He shows a degree of disdain for criticism and fails to observe that it has a place in friendship. From the tone of his essay, it seems that because true friendship implies the proper choice of friends, he feels that criticism is unnecessary. He is speaking in terms of an ideal friendship, which perhaps excuses this aberration of opinion.
11. Virtue
It is commonly agreed that virtue is related to friendship, but the nature of this relationship is described differently by Aristotle and Cicero. Aristotle claims that friendship is itself a virtue, while Cicero asserts that virtue is a prerequisite to friendship when he says that “without virtue friendship cannot exist at all.” In accordance with this view, he says that “nothing… offers stronger incentive to affection” than virtue. Not only does it provide the motivation for friendship, but its presence maintains the relationship: “It is virtue, yes virtue, that initiates and preserves friendship. For it is virtue that is the source of the rational, the stable, the consistent element in life.” The question now becomes whether virtue is the cause of friendship (as Cicero says) or its result (as Aristotle asserts). Since there is no contradiction involved in saying that it is both a cause and an effect, the ideas presented by these two writers can be viewed as complementary. In short, virtue makes friendship possible. Saint Thomas Aquinas also talks about virtue and friendship, not in terms of a natural virtue, however, but in reference to the theological virtue of charity. This will be discussed in the section entitled Friendship with God.
Perfect friendship
After discussing the characteristics of true friendship, it seems appropriate to discuss the ideal human friendship. In examining the sources, one discovers a certain progression of thought on the matter.
The nature of ideal friendship
To begin with, the ideal friendship is a combination of all of the qualities of friendship. It is generally agreed, however, that the essence of ideal friendship is the perfection of one quality in particular. Aristotle asserts that this quality is a sort of justice: “This… is perfect and complete friendship, both in terms of time and in all other respects… Each partner receives in all matters what he gives the other… that is what friends should be able to count on.” This notion of perfect friendship seems insufficient, however. Even Cicero, writing before the time of Christ, rejects this simplistic description: “In my opinion true friendship is too rich, yes, too affluent, for this sort of thing, and does not keep a sharp eye out for fear it may give more than it has received.” He instead chooses to call it a perfect agreement of goals and feelings. This conception, while closer to the Christian idea of friendship, fails to recognize it as a fusion of souls, which is the definition laid out by Augustine in his Confessions: “There is no true friendship unless You [God] weld it between souls that cleave together through that charity which is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost.” Friendship takes on a supernatural quality here which allows for the union of two people on the level of the soul. In an explanation of Augustine’s principle, Paul Henry, SJ, says “that God is the perfect, in fact, the only prototype of that which all love between persons tends to achieve – absolute unity and yet distinction – to be one with the other, not by losing one’s identity but by perfecting it, even at the very source of one’s being.” This is the full Christian understanding of friendship as a union between persons in and through Christ. Secular writers adopt the concept to varying degrees. Montaigne eliminates the mention of God but maintains the notion of unity: “Our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again.” He also states that the sort of exchange mentioned by Aristotle is not even a consideration in perfect friendship: “In this noble relationship, services and benefits, on which other friendships feed, do not even deserve to be taken into account; the reason for this is the complete fusion of our wills.” Emerson, writing in a later period, rediscovers the supernatural quality of this ideal friendship: “…The Deity in me and in them derides and cancels the thick walls of individual character, relation, age, sex, circumstance… and now makes many one.” Thus, there seems to be agreement that ideal friendship involves a sort of unity.
Exclusivity and perfect friendship
The above quote by Emerson urges us to address another aspect of the ideal friendship: Can this perfect relationship apply to more than one of our friends? Aristotle says that true friendship cannot be shared among many: “To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible… For love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique.” To his practical mind, having many ideal friends is a physical impossibility: “The number of our friends [is]… limited. Perhaps it is the largest number with whom a man might be able to live together, for, as we noticed, living together is the surest indication of friendship.” Montaigne offers an even more exclusive description of ideal friendship: “…He who supposes that of two men I love one just as much as the other, and that they love each other and me just as much as I love them, multiplies into a fraternity the most singular and unified of all things, of which even a single one is the rarest thing in the world to find.” Emerson hesitates to make this assertion but claims that “this law of one to one [is] peremptory for conversation, which is the practice and consummation of friendship.” Earlier writers are more fervent in their description of the exclusive nature of friendship. Both Cicero and Montaigne speak of the rarity of this relation; Cicero, speaking through the mouth of Laelius, says he can only name three or four such relationships and Montaigne claims that his relationship with politician Etienne de la Boetie “has no other model than itself, and can be compared only with itself.” Emerson makes a response to this view: “Friendship may be said to require natures so rare and costly… that its satisfaction can very seldom be assured… I am not quite so strict in my terms, perhaps because I have never known so high a fellowship as others.” Common to all of the above perspectives is the idea that true friendship has a certain intensity that lends itself more to an individual than to a crowd.
Aims of friendship
After all of the discussion of the perfect friendship, it seems fair to investigate the motives for friendship. To what end is friendship directed? Aristotle believes that “friendship… consists in the pursuit of a common social life” which, in turn, is the means to the good life. He doesn’t view friendship as merely an instrument to a higher end, however; in fact, he states that “affection is enjoyed for its own sake.” Cicero joins him in this assertion. Although friendship offers many benefits, these benefits are not the end of friendship but simply the result of affection: “Friendship does not follow upon advantage, but advantage upon friendship.” According to Cicero, advantages are subordinate to affection. Little more is said by writers about the aims of friendship, which may indicate the truth of the idea that it is desirable for what it is and not as a means to some higher good.
Friendship and happiness
It may be conceded that friendship is desired for its own sake, but this does not prove that friendship is necessary for happiness. Can we be happy without friends? Aristotle examines this question and concludes that since people are naturally inclined to interact with each other, they will not be happy unless they engage in some sort of interaction:
In misfortune a man needs someone who will do good to him, and in good fortune he will need someone to whom he may do good. It is perhaps also strange to make a supremely happy man live his life in isolation. No one would choose to have all good things by himself, for man is a social and political being… Even a happy man needs society.
Cicero agrees that friendship is essential to happiness, and even places it over material goods in importance because of its lasting nature: “Friendships are a man’s own possession, permanent, stable, and reliable, so much so that even if he should be able to keep those things which we call the gifts of fortune, still his life could not possibly be happy if it were devoid and empty of friends.” Aquinas takes this assertion and qualifies it in light of the Christian tradition. In an allusion to Aristotle, he writes:
If the question refers to the happiness of the present life then, as the Philosopher says, the happy man needs friends… for good activity…. But if the question refers to the perfect happiness we will have in heaven, friendship is not a necessary requirement for happiness since man has in God all the fullness of his perfection. But friendship makes for the well-being of happiness.
He is not downplaying the importance of human friendship, but rather emphasizing the fact that perfect happiness comes from friendship with God: “If there were only one soul loving God, that soul would be happy, though not having a neighbor to love. But supposing the neighbor to be there, love of him follows from perfect love of God.” This friendship with the divine will be discussed later in the section entitled Friendship with God.
Caution in friendship
Returning to the discussion of human friendships, there seems to be an agreement that relationships must be entered with caution. Aristotle says that “one should examine at the beginning by whom the good deed is done and what his conditions are, so that one can accept it on these conditions or reject it,” and Cicero speaks of similar criteria: “We must test and observe first, and then bestow our affections…” These two writers promote caution because the motives of others are not always as noble as they are appear to be. Montaigne promotes a more moderate level of caution when he says that only the “common friendships” require careful examination: According to him, the true friendship can be trusted absolutely, while one “…must walk in those other friendships bridle in hand, with prudence and precaution; the knot is not so well tied that there is no cause to mistrust it.” Saint Augustine also realizes that friends are often not what they seem: “In our present wretched condition we frequently mistake a friend for an enemy, and an enemy for a friend.” He ascribes the deceptive quality of people to man’s fallen nature, as Herbert A. Deane points out:
We must always remember that when [Augustine] says that ‘the laws of men’s nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies,’ he is talking about the natural state of man before the Fall and the introduction into the world of sin…. Augustine’s comment on the hatred and conflict that rage among men is bitterly sorrowful: ‘For there is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race….’ Only among the small number of men who have been redeemed by God’s grace do we find the true unity and concord that are natural to man.
From a Christian perspective, men are untrustworthy as a result of original sin. In short, the fall of mankind has hindered our ability to engage in pure friendship.
Saint Aelred, in his work on spiritual friendship, lays out several stages in establishing such a close bond. He emphasizes a process of probation and discernment:
Not all whom we love should be received into friendship, for not all are found worthy of it. For since your friend is the companion of your soul, to whose spirit you join and attach yours, and so associate yourself that you wish to become one instead of two, since he is one to whom you yourself entrust yourself as to another self, from whom you hide nothing, from whom you fear nothing, you should, in the first place, surely choose one who is considered fitted for all this. Then he is to be tried, and so finally admitted. For friendship should be stable and manifest a certain likeness to eternity, persevering always in affection. And so we ought not, like children, change friends by reason of some vagrant whim. For since there is no one more detestable that the man who injures friendship, and nothing torments the mind more than desertion or insult at the hands of a friend, a friend ought to be chosen with the utmost care and tested with extreme caution. But once admitted, he should be so borne with, so treated, so deferred to, that, as long as he does not withdraw irrevocably from the established foundation, he is yours, and you are his, in body as well as in spirit, so that there will be no division of minds, affections, wills, or judgments. You see, therefore, the four stages by which one climbs to the perfection of friendship: the first is selection, the second probation, the third admission, and the fourth perfect harmony in matters human and divine with charity and benevolence.
This is an exacting standard for friendship, but makes sense in view of the spiritual friendship he describes. In short, one should not choose a companion in the spiritual life without careful consideration.
The degree of loyalty proper to friends
If we cannot trust other people unconditionally, what degree of loyalty do we owe to our friends? Aristotle offers two criteria for weighing our obligations. First of all, he believes that “it is our sacred duty to honor truth more highly [than friends].” Second, Aristotle states that our obligations to a friend should be weighed “in terms of the closeness of his relation to us and in terms of his excellence or usefulness.” He thus implies that we owe the highest loyalty to our families and to those who are useful to us. Cicero is more generous than Aristotle in this regard, adding that “old friendships must always have their proper place reserved for them, for nothing carries the weight of the old and familiar.” Thus our friends deserve the highest degree of loyalty when they are familiar as well as beneficial and closely related to us.
In contrast, what situations demand that we break off our relations? According to Aristotle, one factor in the dissolution of friendship is a change in virtue: “If one partner were to remain as he was, while the other became better and far outdistanced him in excellence, ought the latter to treat the former as a friend? Surely, that is impossible…. How could they still be friends, when they neither like nor feel joy and pain at the same things?” Cicero expresses a parallel sentiment: “The good cannot be friends with the wicked, nor the wicked with the good: there lies between them the widest imaginable gap in character and in interests.” Both writers believe that a divergence of interests (caused by a change in virtue) makes it impossible to maintain a friendship. In regard to those who have fallen from virtue, Aristotle qualifies his statement by saying that the friendship should not be broken off unless “a friend’s wickedness has become incurable… If there is a chance of reforming him, we must come to the aid of his character…” There seem to be certain situations that demand the end of a friendship. In the words of Cicero,
It happens many times in life that important considerations compel us to part from our friends. Anyone who tries to keep us from doing what we must and should in such cases, simply because he cannot bear the thought of losing us, is weak and self-indulgent, and for that very reason no true friend.
The pre-Christian writers focus on human affection in relation to personal needs rather than in relation to the Christian virtue of charity. Herbert Deane, developing the Christian theme of love of neighbor as presented by Saint Augustine, writes that
…when we are commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves, we are meant to apply this injunction to all men, and not simply to our friends or relatives. There is accordingly no one in the whole human family to whom kindly affection is not due by reason of the bond of a common humanity, although it may not be due on the ground of reciprocal love…. Love and kindly affection are due to all men, even to our enemies…
Embracing a Christian way of living does not mean that our enemies should become our friends, but it does require a generous attitude toward adversaries, thus outstripping pre-Christian ideas vis-a-vis human relations.
Can friendships last?
Since friendships must sometimes come to an end, it seems fair to inquire whether or not the best friendships can endure. Opinions are varied on this topic, and can be divided into two basic groups.
The first body of opinion claims that good friendships are lasting by their very nature. This is the opinion of Aristotle, who writes that a relationship between virtuous people lasts as long as they are good, and [that means it will last for a long time, since] goodness or virtue is a thing that lasts. Cicero shares this sentiment; he claims that our essential nature cannot be changed, and for that reason true friendship endures forever. These writers believe that the very goodness of the parties involved holds a friendship together.
In contrast, the second body of thought asserts that friendships are outgrown because no two persons are perfectly suited for each other. This is the opinion of Emerson, who implies that a permanent relationship with someone else would require an abandonment of personal ideals:
Though I prize my friends, I cannot afford to talk with them and study their visions, lest I lose my own. It would indeed give me a certain household joy to quit this lofty seeking and come down to warm sympathies with you; but then I know well I shall mourn always the vanishing of my mighty gods. So I will owe to my friends this evanescent intercourse.
Emerson hints at the idea that his highest priority is a spiritual one, a priority that is deepened when viewed in the light of a Christian’s journey to God. Robert Hugh Benson speaks of human friendships as temporary relations through which we seek a divine friendship:
We form friendships, and grow out of them. It might almost be said that we cannot retain the faculty of friendship unless we are continually making new friends: just as, in religion, in proportion as we form inadequate images and ideas of the divine which for the time we adore, and presently change for others, we progress in the knowledge of the true God. Here then is one of the more princely passions which points to eternity only for the place of its satisfaction, and to the divine love for the answering of its human needs.
In the Christian tradition, it is ultimately a relationship with the divine that all people seek because this is the only type of friendship that will truly satisfy the human heart.
Friendship with God
Paul Henry, S.J., explaining Saint Augustine’s concept of friendship with God, writes: “Divine existence is the ideal of all personal existence – to be fully oneself, but only in dependence upon, and in adherence to, another in the communion of unity.” We are naturally ordered to God, and our union with Him can be perfected when, aware of His love, we respond to it by developing a relationship with Jesus Christ. Robert Hugh Benson writes that
the consciousness of this friendship of Jesus Christ is the very secret of the saints. Ordinary men can live ordinary lives, with little or no open defiance of God, from a hundred second-rate motives. But no man can advance three paces on the road of perfection unless Jesus Christ walks beside him.
He continues by observing that human friendships are incomplete unless these relationships are informed by our friendship with God:
Even the most sacred experiences of life are barren unless his friendship sanctifies them. The purest affection – that affection that unites my dearest friend to myself – is a counterfeit and a usurper unless I love my friend in Christ… unless he, the ideal and absolute friend, is the personal bond that unites us.
Through our friendships with other people we can come to understand in a limited way the sort of friendship we will one day enjoy with God. Aquinas, recognizing the parallelism between the two types of friendship, uses it to explain the dependence of charity on the other two theological virtues:
Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him…. Just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.
Saint Francis of Assisi expressed a similar insight. G.K. Chesterton, in his biography of the saint’s life, recounts a letter that Francis had written to a friar who was, in the words of Chesterton, “struggling between humility and morbidity”:
Do not be troubled in your thoughts, for you are dear to me, and even among the number who are most dear. You know that you are worthy of my friendship and society; therefore, come to me in confidence whenever you will, and from friendship, learn faith.
Saint Paul tells us that charity is not only dependent on faith and hope, but is also superior to them: “Faith, hope, love remain, these three; but the greatest of these is love.” Friendship is an instrument through which this supreme theological virtue can be expressed.
Personal reflections on friendship
One reason that I think friendship is so enjoyable is that it allows us to appreciate qualities in others that we do not ourselves possess. God has made each person unique – indeed, unrepeatable – and friendship gives us a chance to recognize the gifts of others. It can liberate us from some of the narrowness of our own point-of-view. While we possess certain qualities in common with our friends, I think that much of the pleasure we receive from friendship arises from the uniqueness we discover in others.
As a final comment, I would agree that ideal friendship is singular in nature. I think it describes the relationship we can share with God. We can have strong and vital friendships with others to the extent that we have this primary friendship with God, a relationship that, with His aid and our cooperation, will reach its fullness in the life to come. His love becomes the source and stimulus of our love not only for Him, but for others. Our friendships in this world can help prepare us for the self-giving love of beatitude, in which our union with God and our communion with others will finally be experienced as a single movement of love, as the gift of friendship fully realized and shared, corresponding completely to the desire and design of the human heart.
